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RECENT DECISIONS
Wrongful Death -Release from Liability Through Contract of De-
cedent - Plaintiff's employee, as a condition of employment agreed
that, in case of death resulting from an accident in the course of his
employment while traveling on a railroad which the employer had
agreed to indemnify against any liability for the employee's death from
accident, employee's personal representatives would look for compen-
sation solely to the Workman's Compensation Act, and that the railroad
would not be held liable. Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin the de-
cedent employee's administratrix from prosecuting an action against the
railroad to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of her
intestate, due to the negligence of said railroad. Held: the agreement
of decedent was enforceable and the employer was entitled to enjoin
employee's administratrix from maintaining an action against the rail-
road for the death of the employee where employee's dependents had
received Workmen's Compensation. Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Cochran, 91 N.Y.S. (2d) 792 (1949).
One particularly glaring legal deficiency in the comparatively re-
cent common law of both England and the United States was that no
remedy existed for the death of a person injured by the wrongful act
of another. A tort action lay for injuries sustained while the victim
lived, but upon his decease such action died also.' Legislative steps
were taken to correct this shortcoming and provide redress, not only
for the damages suffered by the deceased, but also losses endured by
those dependent upon him and close of kin to him.
The first example of such legislation was Lord Campbell's Act in
England in 1846.2 This act provided a typical pattern from which sub-
sequent American statutes were derived. Notwithstanding the fact that
Lord Campbell's Act was used as a pattern, the American statutes pre-
sented wide variations, and, in many instances, only remotely resembled
the English Act.
There are three distinct types of wrongful death statutes prevalent
in the various states. Survival statutes only serve to preserve the right
of action had by the deceased while he still lived.3 A new cause of ac-
' City of Milwaukee v. Boynton Cab Co., 201 Wis. 581, 231 N.W. 597 (1930).
29 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846). This statute provides essentially: 1) an action may
be maintained whenever death is caused through neglect, wrongful act, or
default, which would entitle decedent to sue if death had not ensued; 2) such
action is for the benefit of certain designated n'embers of deceased's family
or close of kin; 3) the damages recoverable are those suffered by such bene-
ficiaries by reason of the death. See 25 C.J.S. 1076.
3 Wis. Stat. (1947) 331.01, "In addition to the actions which survive at common
law the following shall also survive: . . for assault and battery, false impris-
onment or other damage to the person. . ."
1950]
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tion arises under some of the enactments, which enures to the benefit
of designated members of the deceased's family or close of kin.4 Final-
ly, the wrongful act itself and culpability therefore is penalized through
statutes which provide for such punishment in a civil tort action.5
The distinctions between these three types of statutes are apparent
upon consideration of the decisions construing them.
Survival statutes are strictly applied with reference to the rights of
the decedent. Thus, his contributory negligence presents a valid de-
fense to the action ;' so also do releases by him through settlement or
other satisfaction.7
A decided divergence is found in the application of those statutes
which give rise to an entirely new cause of action. There may be found
in the cases two lines of interpretation. As is noted in the principal
case, New York leans toward the rigidity found in decisions under the
survival statutes which consider primarily the rights of the deceased.
A far more liberal view is recognized in jurisdictions wherein the pri-
mary consideration is not the injury to the deceased, but the damages
suffered by the beneficiaries of the recovery. A marked illustration of
this latter view is presented by the decision in Adams v. Northern Ry.
Co.8 The issue and facts there were quite analogous to those in the in-
stant New York case, and, in deciding that the decedent could not con-
tract away the rights protected by the statute, the court said:
"The statutes of Idaho are similar to the statutes of this state
(Washington), in providing that, when the death of a person
is caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another, his heirs
or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages
against the person causing the death; and in every such action
the jury may give such damages, pecuniary or exemplary, as,
under all circumstances of the case, may seem just. Under this
law the plaintiffs have a right of action to recover for their own
loss, and they are not suing to enforce a right of the deceased
4 Wis. Stat. (1947) 331.03; 331.04, embracing substantially the same provisions
as Lord Campbell's act in note 2 above.
5 General Laws of Massachusetts (1932) Chap. 229, sec. 5, "... a person who
by his negligence or by his wilful, wanton or reckless act ... causes the death
of a person in the exercise of due care, who is not in his employment or serv-
ice, shall be liable in damages in the sum of not less than five hundred nor
more than ten thousand dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree
of his culpability .... to be recovered in an action of tort. . . ." It has been
held under penal statutes that the decedent cannot, by contract, release the
defendant from liability. Commonwealth v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 108 Mass.
7, 11 Am.R. 301 (1871).
6Walkup v. Covington, 18 Tenn. App. 117, 73 S.W. (2d) 718 (1933).
7Brown v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 77 N.W. 748 (1899).
895 F. 938, 940 (1899) ; affirmed 116 F. 324 (1902).
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to recover damages for the injury which he suffered. Therefore
the contract by which the decedent agreed to exempt the defen-
dant from liability has no effect whatever on their right of
action."
In looking at decisions based upon the different statutes, it seems
apparent that none of them completely remedy the two wrongs in-
volved. They are concerned with either the rights of the decedent, or
the rights of his beneficiaries, but not both. The legislature of Wis-
consin, with several others, has gone a step further by enacting statutes
which not only allow the decedent's action to survive, but also com-
pensate for the resulting wrongs inflicted upon those who depended on
him for support and companionship. While such statutes ordinarily
limit the amount of recovery that can be had, such limitation is a rea-
sonable one and does afford substantial relief. 9
The policy evident in Wisconsin and states having similar statutes
is to provide complete relief for all injuries resulting from the wrong-
ful act which caused death.10 There is no particular reason why other
jurisdictions should limit the amount of damages to the amount which
the decedent might have recovered;" or determine the rights of bene-
ficiaries of the statutes solely on the basis of the rights of the decedent,
as was done in the instant case. Perhaps the courts have lost sight of
the legislative intent upon which the enactments were founded. If so,
it is incumbent upon such legislatures to reiterate and clarify their in-
tent by appropriate amendments and further enactments.
WILLIAM A. ADLER
Constitutional Law -Discrimination Between Natural and Natural-
ized Citizens - Plaintiff became a naturalized citizen in 1928. He went
to Palestine in 1934 and remained there until 1947, when he returned
to the United States. When he presented his certificate of citizenship
to the Immigration authorities at New York they excluded him on the
ground that he had expatriated himself under Section 804, 8 U.S.C.A.
and was an alien without a quota immigration visa. That section pro-
vided: "A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose
9 Supra, note 3 and note 4.
10 Brown v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (supra, note 7) ; Koehler v. Waukesha
Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (1926). These cases, in distinguishing be-
tween the two types of Wis. statutes, note that they give rise to two causes
of action: one, a survival of decedent's cause of action, and the other, a new
cause of action in favor of the deceased's beneficiaries. Thus, the injuries to
both the decedent and the beneficiaries are compensated for.
1125 CJ.S. 1238.
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